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Entrepreneurial Stewardship: Why Some
Profits Should Be Used to Benefit Others
Jooho Lee
Pepperdine University
ABSTRACT: Entrepreneurs should act as stewards of entrepreneurial rent. Entre-
preneurial rent is the difference between the ex post value of a venture and its ex ante
costs. It is the result of competition among buyers and sellers within the market
process rather than the sole efforts of the entrepreneur. As a result, entrepreneurs
should allocate entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants
rather than consuming it for themselves. The moral obligation to steward entrepre-
neurial rent is consistent with traditional bases of property rights and the norm of
social welfare maximization, and it applies to corporations and their shareholders,
as well as individual entrepreneurs.
KEY WORDS: entrepreneurship, stewardship, rent, profits, property
T his article presents and defends a concept that it will call “entrepreneurialstewardship.” In general, a steward is someone who acts for the benefit of
the collective rather than one’s self (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). A
steward of a resource has an obligation to exercise control over the resource mainly
for the benefit of others, andwith due regard to their interests rather than the interests
of the steward (Lucy & Mitchell, 1996). Entrepreneurial stewardship refers to the
idea that entrepreneurs have a moral obligation to act as stewards of entrepreneurial
rent. Entrepreneurial rent refers to “the difference between a venture’s ex post value
(or payment stream) and the ex ante cost (or value) of the resources combined to form
the venture” (Rumelt, 1987: 17). Unlike accounting profit, which is the difference
between total revenue and total cost, entrepreneurial rent is what is left over after
accounting for all underlying economic costs of an entrepreneurial venture, includ-
ing the costs of labor and capital. Because it allows the entrepreneur to consume a
portion of total revenue as compensation for labor and/or capital, entrepreneurial
stewardship is compatible with entrepreneurial activity motivated by self-interest
rather than pure charity. However, insofar as the entrepreneur profits beyond com-
pensation for labor and capital, this article argues that they have amoral obligation to
act as a steward of such extra profit by refraining from consuming it for themselves,
which this article defines as the allocation of a resource in accordance with one’s
own interests rather than the interests of others. Instead, entrepreneurs should
allocate entrepreneurial rent in accordance with the interests of other market partic-
ipants. Any coincidence of the interests of the entrepreneur and of other market
participants ought to be a side effect rather than the intended aim of the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurial stewardship is an umbrella concept that is intended to be broad
and ecumenical enough to be compatible with both rights-based and consequential-
ist moral theories. Although the concept of entrepreneurial stewardship requires
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entrepreneurs to allocate entrepreneurial rent in accordance with the interests of
othermarket participants rather than consuming it for themselves, it is insufficient on
its own to provide any further concrete guidance about how they ought to do
so. Exactly what entrepreneurs should do with entrepreneurial rent will depend on
the specific moral theory used to make the determination, along with the particulars
of the entrepreneurial venture and its context. For instance, utilitarian theories may
require entrepreneurs to allocate entrepreneurial rent to maximize social welfare,
whereas rights-based theories may require that entrepreneurs identify the relevant
individuals and business entities whose interests ought to prevail over the interests of
the entrepreneur. And depending on the nature of the market in which one partic-
ipates, the production process of the entrepreneur, the investment one undertakes,
etc., it may even be appropriate under some moral theories for entrepreneurs to
reinvest entrepreneurial rent in other ventures. As a result, a discussion of the
practical implications of entrepreneurial stewardship is beyond the scope of this
article. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive list of all possible
applications of entrepreneurial stewardship according to various moral theories, this
article will merely attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of the concept by focusing
on one possible justification of the concept and showing how it is compatible with
other major moral theories.
Entrepreneurial stewardship is also amoral obligation and not necessarily a public
policy recommendation. Amoral obligation provides reasons for howwe should act,
whereas a public policy recommendation provides reasons for how a political
authority should set its policies based on how we will act. As a moral obligation,
entrepreneurial stewardship does not merely suggest that stewarding entrepreneurial
rent would be virtuous or supererogatory. It requires entrepreneurs to allocate
entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants rather than consum-
ing it for themselves. Nevertheless, entrepreneurial stewardship does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a political authority should enforce the moral obligation
through policy measures. Aside from general concerns about governmental inter-
vention in markets and other private affairs, there may be significant practical
limitations to the feasibility of using public policy tools to impose the moral
obligation of entrepreneurial stewardship on unwilling actors. For instance, even
if there were good moral reasons to impose a tax on entrepreneurial rent, it may not
be possible for a public authority to institute an efficient andwell-functioning system
to collect and redistribute taxes on entrepreneurial rent. Of course, the moral obli-
gation to steward entrepreneurial rent might help to justify adopting or eliminating
certain public policy measures, but an analysis of suchmeasures is beyond the scope
of this article. This article only argues that entrepreneurial stewardship gives rise to a
moral obligation for entrepreneurs to refrain from consuming entrepreneurial rent
and to allocate it for the benefit of othermarket participants. It makes no claims about
whether or not others should confiscate entrepreneurial rent from entrepreneurs or
compel them to give it away against their will.
This article proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the scope of entrepre-
neurial stewardship by defining the core concepts of entrepreneurship and entrepre-
neurial rent. It argues that entrepreneurial rent is a distinct type of profit created by
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the market process and that it is distinguishable from compensation for the
entrepreneur’s labor. The second section presents a positive argument in favor of
entrepreneurial stewardship. It argues that the right to self-ownership, which is a core
tenet of theories that place significant importance on private property rights, leads
to the conclusion that market participants should have a collective right to
entrepreneurial rent. The third section discusses various rights-based objections to
entrepreneurial stewardship. It argues that traditional bases for respecting property
rights, such as autonomy or desert, do not apply to entrepreneurial rent because
entrepreneurial rent is created by the market process. The fourth section discusses
entrepreneurial stewardship and its effects on social welfare. It argues that entrepre-
neurial stewardship does not necessarily interfere with the efficient allocation of
resources and can be made compatible with the moral obligation to maximize social
welfare. Lastly, because corporations play an important entrepreneurial function
within the modern economy, the fifth section discusses entrepreneurial stewardship
within the corporate context. It discusses the cost of equity capital and argues that a
corporation’s shareholders acquire the stewardship obligation when the corporation
transfers entrepreneurial rent to them.
THE SCOPE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL STEWARDSHIP
A popular image of the entrepreneur is someone who starts one’s own business.
However, at least for the purposes of this article, an entrepreneur is any economic
actor that discovers, evaluates, and exploits opportunities to create future goods or
services by engaging in the market process (Kirzner, 1973; Shane &Venkataraman,
2000). In this view, entrepreneurship is an economic function rather than a personal
or social identity. As a result, entrepreneurship is not synonymous with starting
one’s own business. Merely starting one’s own business is not sufficient to classify
someone as an entrepreneur. For instance, creating a social enterprise that sells
donated goods to the needy for whatever price they are able to pay is not engaging
in entrepreneurship because there would not be any meaningful engagement in the
market process. More importantly, starting one’s own business is not necessary to
classify someone as an entrepreneur. Existing businesses may—and often do—
regularly engage in entrepreneurship. Lastly, because entrepreneurship is an eco-
nomic function, entrepreneurs need not be individuals. Corporations and other
business entities will often engage in entrepreneurial activities, and, as a result,
entrepreneurial stewardship is applicable for not only individuals but also other
economic entities as well.
Entrepreneurs discover opportunities to create future goods or services by engag-
ing in the market process. Market competition has the tendency to bring the alloca-
tion of resources to an equilibrium, i.e., a point where resources are valued at a level
equal to their economic cost. Under hypothetical conditions of general equilibrium
where all opportunities for gains from trade are exhausted, there is no room for
entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1997). However, markets are never in perfect equilib-
rium. Instead, real-world markets are better described as a process. The market
process is “a series of systematic changes in the interconnected network of market
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decisions… generated by the flow of market information released by market par-
ticipation” (Kirzner, 1973: 10). Market participation consists of a competition
among multiple buyers and multiple sellers who seek to maximize their holdings
by buying for as little as possible and/or selling for as much as possible. Buying and
selling in themarket generates information about the preferences of other buyers and
sellers. Equippedwith information about buyer and seller preferences, entrepreneurs
discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities to create future goods or services that
can better satisfy buyer or seller preferences. As entrepreneurs exploit such oppor-
tunities, they bring the market process closer to the hypothetical general equilibrium
by unlocking more efficient ways of allocating scarce resources.
Imagine, for instance, that Robinson, a coconut grower, and Friday, a pineapple
grower, are the only two economic actors on an island. If Robinson and Friday were
to engage in trade by haggling over the price of coconuts and pineapples, they would
not be engaging in the market process. The market process requires more than the
competition between buyers and sellers over the surplus associated with an
economic exchange. It requires buyers competing with other buyers and sellers
competing with other sellers. If, on the other hand, Robinson and Friday awake
one day to encounter Xury, who possesses both coconuts and pineapples, the
allocation of coconuts and pineapples on the island can be accomplished through
the market process. Since there would be at least two suppliers and two buyers for
each resource in such a scenario, each party’s preference to maximize their holdings
can lead to a competition among all three inhabitants of the island to buy for the
lowest price and sell for the highest price. Robinson’s participation within such a
competitive process will generate information about Friday and Xury’s preferences.
For instance, hemight discover that Fridaywould bewilling to sell his pineapples for
cheaper if someonewere to buy them in bulk or that Xury is willing to pay a premium
for tropical drinks. Robinson would act as an entrepreneur if he were to then exploit
this knowledge to create future goods or services. He might buy pineapples in bulk
for cheap and then create and sell canned pineapples for cheaper than fresh pineap-
ples, or he might buy fresh pineapples and combine themwith his coconuts to create
a tropical drink for sale. By engaging in the buying and selling of resources based on
information gained from market participation, Robinson would help the inhabitants
of the island make more efficient use of pineapples and coconuts, assuming that
certain basic conditions for a well-functioning market are met.
Entrepreneurs create future goods or services under conditions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is a technical concept that is distinguishable from risk (Knight, 1921).
Risk refers to the likelihood of an outcome within a known distribution of possible
outcomes, whereas uncertainty refers to the likelihood of an outcome within an
unknown distribution of possible outcomes. For instance, betting one’s money on
the outcome of a roll of the dice entails the assumption of risk without any uncer-
tainty because the probability of the hoped-for outcome follows an entirely known
distribution of possible outcomes. On the other hand, ancient travelers undertaking
an expedition to explore a previously unknown part of the world did somostly under
conditions of uncertainty because none of them could have known what possible
outcome awaited them in the unexplored world. Of course, aside from such
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extremes, most human activity in the world today entails a degree of risk and
uncertainty, but some activities nevertheless mostly entail risk whereas others
mostly entail uncertainty. For instance, selling earthquake insurance in southern
California mostly entails risk rather than uncertainty, because we can analyze
historical data to estimate the likelihood that an earthquake will occur within a
specified time period. Since the probability of an outcome is fairly well-known,
the risk of a future earthquake can be priced in the market today, albeit imperfectly,
and compensation for assuming the risk of a future earthquake can be thought to be a
function of the market for the assumption of risk. On the other hand, entrepreneur-
ship mostly entails operating under conditions of uncertainty. Future demand for
goods or services within the market process does not follow any known distribution
of possible outcomes. As a result, even with robust historical data, entrepreneurs
undertake a venture to produce goods or services for sale in the future without
anything approaching a known probability of future demand, particularly when
the venture entails some novelty or innovation. Furthermore, assuming that the
market for entrepreneurial inputs works reasonably well, today’s prices for the
entrepreneur’s inputs will have already incorporated the price of the known risks
associated with purchasing them. As a result, the primary function of entrepreneur-
ship is to incur present-day costs in anticipation for future revenues under conditions
of uncertainty rather than risk (Knight, 1921).
Uncertainty within the market process presents entrepreneurs an opportunity to
capture entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial rent is a specific type of economic rent
generated by themarket process. Although there are various definitions of economic
rent (Schneider & Valenti, 2011; Wessel, 1967), it generally refers to payments that
exceed the minimum level required to make a scarce economic input available for
use (Schoemaker, 1990). However, whereas other forms of economic rent are
determined by comparing the value of different resources in a static world, entre-
preneurial rent is determined by comparing ex ante costs, i.e., the costs associated
with the venture at the time they were incurred, with ex post returns, i.e., the value of
the returns associated with the venture at the time that they are realized (Rumelt,
1987). Ex ante costs are incurred under conditions of uncertainty prior to knowing
the market demand for future goods or services, whereas ex post returns are realized
after the uncertainty is removed. Entrepreneurial rent results from the disjuncture
between what the markets will pay for resources under current conditions and what a
successful entrepreneur realizes in the future after having made necessary invest-
ments under conditions of uncertainty. Although the prices of goods and services in
the market incorporate current expectations of future demand, market prices cannot
reflect the actual demand in the future with any degree of certainty. As a result,
entrepreneurial rent is possible when future demand ends up being higher than
current expectations. In the example above, Robinson might undertake a venture
to create a tropical drink without knowing how much he will be able to charge for
them. He nevertheless may do so because he is more optimistic about the future
demand for pineapples and coconuts than others on the island. He might be opti-
mistic because he is confident in the future demand for the innovative product—the
tropical drink—that he alone can envision, or he might simply be a more optimistic
Entrepreneurial Stewardship
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2019.51
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 74.62.174.243, on 06 Mar 2020 at 20:57:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
person. Regardless of what the reasons for his optimismmay be, what matters is that
Robinson is optimistic about his chances of beating the market. Whereas others on
the island are charging $1 per serving for pineapples and coconuts based on their
current and expected supply and demand, Robinson might believe that he will be
able to chargemore for the combination of pineapples and coconuts in the future than
what it would cost him to purchase them today. If he purchases pineapples at $1 per
serving and incurs an additional $1 in costs associated with growing his coconuts
and creating his drink, his per serving ex ante cost for his venture would be $2
because these investments were all made under conditions of uncertainty. Yet, if he
manages to convince Xury to purchase a new tropical drink for $3 per serving, the
uncertainty is removed at that point. His ex post return will be $3 per serving, and he
will have captured an entrepreneurial rent of $1 per serving.
Entrepreneurial stewardship focuses only on entrepreneurial rent rather than more
broadly on all forms of economic rent because it is intended to be an umbrella concept
that is compatible with both rights-based and consequentialist theories. A moral
obligation to steward all forms of economic rent would not be compatible with some
moral theories. For instance, imagine that Wilt is an owner of a beautiful and unique
acre of land. Although the going rate for an acre of land is $50, Elgin is a property
developer willing to pay $75 forWilt’s land due to its unique location. IfWilt sells his
land to Elgin for $75, $25would be a formof economic rent that hewould capture due
to the unique characteristics of his land, assuming that $50 would be the minimum
amount required to make it available for economic use. Putting aside for a moment
what Wilt should do with the rent that he captures, an obligation to refrain from
consuming any kind of economic rent would put Elgin, the entrepreneur, in a difficult
situation. Any future sale of the developed land to others would require Elgin to keep
only $50 of the proceeds attributable to the land itself. Neither could Elgin profit from
his unique skills or talents, since such profit would also be economic rent that accrues
from the characteristics of his labor. As a result, Elgin would need to add value to the
land only due to the sheer quantity of labor valued at the lowest possible labor rate in
society (Mack, 1992). Developing land would thus be a no-win scenario for Elgin.
The best he could dowould be to receive compensation for the lowest possible rate for
his labor while also taking a $25 loss on the land. Although some consequentialist
moral theories might nevertheless require Elgin to take such a loss if it would
adequately benefit others, some rights-basedmoral theories would argue that it would
be unfair to require Elgin to suffer such a loss for the sake of benefiting others. On the
other hand, appeasing such rights-based theories by allowing him to purchase Wilt’s
land at a price at which he wouldn’t suffer any loss—while nevertheless prohibiting
Elgin from consuming the $25 in economic rent—would result in his purchasing it for
$50. But such a result would undermine the market process of efficiently allocating
scarce resources, because, despite its unique beauty and potential,Wilt’s landwill sell
for a price that is equal to the price of inferior land. Although it is by nomeans perfect,
the price mechanism within the market process is the best available means of coor-
dinating information about buyer and seller preferences to maximize the social value
of scarce resources (Hayek, 1945).Without the difference in price to signal toWilt that
Elgin places a higher value on the land than other buyers, Wilt would be much more
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likely to sell his land to someone who would not value it as much as Elgin. Although
such a conclusion may be acceptable to certain accounts of entrepreneurial steward-
ship that prioritize rights over consequences, it is not acceptable to utilitarians and
otherswho permit some tradeoff between rights andwelfare. Fortunately, both pitfalls
can be avoided by limiting the focus of entrepreneurial stewardship to only entrepre-
neurial rent, which refers to the difference between ex post gains and ex ante costs of
the venture. By recognizing the full market value of the ex ante costs of an entrepre-
neurial venture within the calculation of entrepreneurial rent, entrepreneurial
stewardship allows entrepreneurs to pay the full market value of their inputs and to
allocate a portion of their ex post revenues to fully cover the ex ante costs of their inputs
before incurring any stewardship obligations. Regardless of the potential disagree-
ments about what entrepreneurs should do with other portions of their income, the
following sections will argue that both rights-based theorists and consequentialist
theorists can agree on a moral obligation to steward entrepreneurial rent.
An important challenge to conceptualizing entrepreneurial rent is the difficulty of
separating out entrepreneurial rent from compensation for the entrepreneur’s labor.
As noted above, all underlying economic costs must be included in the calculation of
entrepreneurial rent, including compensation for labor and capital. However,
although the ex ante costs of capital can be determined by the market for capital,
complications can arise in determining the costs associated with the entrepreneur’s
labor. There may be good reasons to resort to the market process to determine
compensation for labor (Heath, 2018). And if it were the case that, like the price
of other goods and services within a modern economy, compensation for entrepre-
neurial labor ought to be determined through the market process, determining the
amount of compensation for entrepreneurial labor can be difficult since the entre-
preneur does not sell his services in the labor market. One seeming solutionmight be
to postulate a market for entrepreneurship consisting of potential entrepreneurs who
seek to supply their services to meet a societal demand for eliminating existing
inefficiencies in the market (Casson, 1982). If such a market were to exist, entre-
preneurship would merely be a type of labor in which one acts to eliminate social
inefficiencies, and entrepreneurial rent would be compensation determined by a
specific type of labor market.
However, entrepreneurial rent is fundamentally different from market-based
compensation because markets coordinate the allocation of resources by setting
prices ex ante, i.e., by directing where resources will go; whereas entrepreneurial
rent is only realized ex post, i.e., once the resource has been allocated. The allocation
of labor in society according to themarket process tracks relative supply and demand
by utilizing the price of labor to inform the labor allocation decisions of workers.
Suppose, for instance, that the supply of workers for job A were twice as high as the
supply of workers for jobB, and that employer Bwaswilling to pay twice asmuch as
employer A. In a well-functioning market, more laborers will do what they can to be
suitable for employer B, and thus increase the labor supply for job B, because they
know that employer B is paying a higher price than employer A. In other words,
wages must be knowable prior to labor allocation if they are to be determined through
themarket process. If wageswere unknowable, the pricemechanismwould not be able
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to coordinate the allocation of labor, thus undermining what it would mean for there to
be amarket for labor at all. And since entrepreneurs undertake entrepreneurial ventures
under conditions of uncertainty, they do so without the ability to know the amount of
entrepreneurial rent ex ante. As a result, it could not be the case that entrepreneurial rent
could constitute market-based compensation for entrepreneurial labor.
Instead, if compensation for entrepreneurial labormust be determined by amarket
process, it might be possible to conceptualize compensation for entrepreneurial labor
indirectly within the market for capital as the expected return of an entrepreneurial
venture ex ante. Within such an approach, entrepreneurial rent would be the portion
of profits that exceeds the expected return of an entrepreneurial venture. When
pricing the costs of various economic inputs, even the most idealized market process
would not reduce the expected return of an entrepreneurial venture to nothing more
than the costs of capital. Returning to the example above, if coconuts and pineapples
each cost $1 per serving, Robinson would not be willing to mix pineapples and
coconuts to create a tropical drink if he expects it to sell for only $2 per serving. Since
pineapples and coconuts cost $2 per serving themselves, selling a mixture of
pineapples and coconuts for $2 per serving would entail performing the service of
mixing those two ingredients for free. Instead, if there were already a well-
functioning market for tropical drinks, one would expect to pay more than $2 per
serving to account for the cost of labor. If tropical drinks were to cost $2.50 within
such a hypothetical market, the cost of the entrepreneur’s labor would amount to
$.50 per serving. Of course, therewouldn’t be an actualmarket for the entrepreneur’s
product at the time that the entrepreneur’s labor is incurred. However, there are
market-based approaches within the market for capital to price future goods or
services based on current expectations. For instance, if Robinson were to request
financing from investors to fund his tropical drink venture, economic actors like
venture capital firms will make their investment decisions based on the expected
return of his venture. So, again, suppose that Friday’s tropical drinks were to cost $2
per serving in raw capital inputs like pineapples and coconuts and that a venture
capital firm purchases a 40 percent stake in his tropical drink venture based on a
valuation of the business that incorporates an assumption that it will be able to charge
$2.50 per serving. Given the uncertainty of undertaking a venture like this, such an
assumption would be informed by both historical data and future projections based
on current market conditions rather than any known probability of different possible
outcomes. Nevertheless, in such a scenario, the cost of capital and labor associated
with the venture would amount to $.50 per serving. Given the venture capital firm’s
40 percent stake, one can roughly estimate the cost of entrepreneurial labor to be $.30
per serving, with the cost of capital equaling $.20 per serving. If, however, the
eventual cost of tropical drinks ends up being $3 per serving due to market condi-
tions in the future, Friday’s venture will capture $.50 in entrepreneurial rent per
serving, translating into $.30 for Friday and $.20 for the venture capital firm.
Of course, entrepreneurial stewardship does not require that compensation for
entrepreneurial labor be determined by a market process. Certain moral theories
might allow or even require that non-market principles play at least a partial role in
determining just compensation for labor (Moriarty, 2012). As a result, rather than
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conceptualizing entrepreneurial rent as the excess of the expected value of a venture
at the time that costs are incurred under conditions of uncertainty, it also might be
possible to account for the ex ante costs of labor and/or capital based on theories of
just compensation. In either case, what is important is that there are existing methods
of including compensation for entrepreneurial labor and the assumption of riskwithin
the calculation of entrepreneurial rent. Furthermore, as a practical matter, distinguish-
ing between ex ante costs and ex post realized gains is likely to be a complicated
accounting problem that will depend on both the particularities of the venture and the
contingencies of its social context. For instance, rather than calculating entrepreneur-
ial rent for each unit of a future good or service, it might be more plausible to account
for entrepreneurial rent as the cumulative difference between the gains associated
with the venture at the time that they are realized and the costs at the time that they are
incurred. From this perspective, entrepreneurswould begin to capture entrepreneurial
rent only after they have recouped the entirety of their ex ante costs. Nevertheless,
regardless of how the ex ante costs of capital and labor are conceptualized or how the
accounting problem is resolved as a practical matter, entrepreneurial rent is a portion
of profits that is conceptually distinct from the ex ante costs associatedwith economic
inputs, including capital and labor. Entrepreneurial stewardship applies to only this
conceptually distinct portion of an entrepreneur’s profits.
Lastly, the possibility of entrepreneurial rent—and the resulting moral obligation
of entrepreneurial stewardship—exists even in a well-functioning market because
uncertainty is inherent within the market process. A well-functioning market is one
without any market failures, which are defined as instances “in which the compet-
itive market … fails egregiously to produce an efficient outcome.” (Heath, 2006:
549). Of course, one may be able to capture entrepreneurial rent by causing a market
failure. For instance, a producer may be able to capture entrepreneurial rent by
raising artificial barriers to entry to a market, thus leading to an inefficient outcome.
One may also be able to capture entrepreneurial rent simply by being the beneficiary
of a market failure caused by some other source. A natural disaster that temporarily
halts the supply of essential goods, for instance, might allow somemerchants to raise
prices for their goods and thus capture entrepreneurial rent merely because theywere
in the right place at the right time. There are good reasons to think that entrepreneurs
should not benefit from market failures, and it seems likely that any benefit from
egregiousmarket imperfections ought to be stewarded aswell. However, uncertainty
is an inherent aspect of the market process because, as noted above, future supply
and demand does not follow any known distributions of possible outcomes. And
because entrepreneurs undertake ventures under conditions of economic uncertainty,
the potential for entrepreneurial rent will always exist, even within well-functioning
markets. This article will assume a well-functioning market when discussing entre-
preneurial stewardship to rule out other potential moral restrictions to the ways in
which an entrepreneur can benefit from imperfections in the market process.
In sum, entrepreneurial stewardship applies to a broad class of economic actors in
a narrow class of circumstances. Anyone who engages in the market process to
create future goods or services is an entrepreneur. Out of those who engage in
economic production or allocation, only those who do so outside of the market
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process should not be considered entrepreneurs. Employees of a business, for
instance, should not be considered entrepreneurs because they engage in economic
activity within the firm under the employer’s direction rather than within the market
process (Lee, 2017). However, despite such a broad definition of entrepreneurs, the
circumstance under which entrepreneurial stewardship applies is limited only to the
realization of entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurs do not necessarily have an obli-
gation to steward all types of economic rent, such as the above-average returns
associated with a more productive economic input. Neither do they necessarily have
an obligation to refrain from paying themselves or their financiers. Instead, entre-
preneurial stewardship applies only to extra profits that exceed all ex ante costs
associated with the entrepreneurial venture. Thus, whereas every economic actor is
potentially an entrepreneur, a substantially smaller percentage of entrepreneurs
could ever be obligated to steward entrepreneurial rent.
WHY ENTREPRENEURIAL STEWARDSHIP?
Before arguing that entrepreneurs do not have any special claim to entrepreneurial
rent, which is the task of the sections after this one, this section will first argue that
the right to self-ownership leads to the moral obligation to steward entrepreneurial
rent. The right to self-ownership refers to the idea that “nobody but me has the right
to dispose ofme or to direct my actions” (Waldron, 1988: 398). Although this right is
discussed primarily in political philosophy as a justification for certain kinds of
property regimes, such discussions are “not… about self-ownership at all, but rather
about the downstream political implications of self-ownership” (Thrasher, 2020).
Rather than a political right, the right to self-ownership is fundamentally a moral
right to one’s own body, actions, and resources with which one has a special
relationship. To make claims about the right to self-ownership is thus often “merely
a way of talking about autonomy” (Pateman, 2002: 20), and the right itself is
compatible with not only libertarianism but also various accounts of egalitarianism
(Otsuka, 1998) andMarxism (Cohen, 1995). In fact, disagreements between various
political conclusions can be thought to be disagreements about the particular
incidents of and limits to the moral right to self-ownership rather than its acceptance
or rejection (Taylor, 2005). Nevertheless, a robust account of the right to self-
ownership remains a core tenet of libertarian theories that tend to be the most
resistant to restrictions on private property rights. Putting aside some strong objec-
tions to its plausibility (e.g., Arneson, 1991; Sobel, 2012), this sectionwill argue that
even such a robust right to self-ownership would lead to the conclusion that market
participants should have a collective right to entrepreneurial rent because it is a
benefit associated with the collective labor of market participants rather than just the
entrepreneur. By arguing that entrepreneurial stewardship follows from even such a
principle, this section seeks to provide an argument that can be acceptable to even
those who remain committed to libertarian principles. To be clear, the argument in
this section is not intended to be an exhaustive argument for entrepreneurial stew-
ardship. There are likely other reasons stemming from a variety ofmoral theories that
would support entrepreneurial stewardship. This sectionmerely provides one reason
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to support entrepreneurial stewardship given the absence of other reasons to the
contrary, which will be discussed in the next sections.
A robust account of the moral right to self-ownership includes an exclusive right
to the natural benefits associated with one’s labor. Although some accounts refer to
the right to self-ownership simply as an analogue to a slave owner’s legal rights to his
slave (Cohen, 1995), most plausible accounts ground the right on the importance of
securing one’s autonomy or liberty interests. Some have argued that one’s autonomy
or liberty interests underlying the right to self-ownership does not secure the right to
benefit from the exchange of our talents and energies because what we can receive
from others is contingent on a variety of factors outside of the sphere of our control
(Christman, 1991). From this perspective, the right to self-ownership protects only
the right to do what we please with ourselves and our property, not the right to what
we can gain from its exchange. However, even if such accounts were correct, there
are still ways in which one can benefit from one’s talents and energies independently
from what others are willing to exchange for one’s labor. Such benefits, which this
article will refer to as natural benefits, are the realization of the purpose with which
one applies one’s talents and energies to resources to which others have no right.We
do not lose our right to our own talents and energies merely because we direct them
toward a particular purpose. Otherwise, the right to our talents and energies would be
meaningless since we could not direct them in any way without losing our right to
them. And since labor is nothing more than the application of one’s talents and
energies to bring about an intended purpose, we do not lose our right to the natural
benefits associated with our labor whenwe apply our talents and energies to realize a
purpose without infringing on anyone else’s right. For instance, I might work to
create a song because I wish to enjoy hearing myself sing it. The enjoyment of my
singing is a benefit associated with my labor, because it was the purpose for which I
applied my talents and energies. Moreover, it is a natural benefit, because neither the
creation of the song nor the actual singing was contingent on anything to which
others had a right. In such an instance, I would not wrong you by refusing to allow
you to enjoy the natural benefits associated with my labor, just as I would not wrong
you by refusing to allow you to take my kidney for your benefit.
Of course, one’s right to the entire result of one’s labor also depends on the claims
that others might have on the resource inputs with which one mixes one’s labor. If I
were to labor alone with resource inputs that I exclusively own, the entire result of
my labor would constitute a natural benefit, and thus rightfully belong exclusively to
me under the right to self-ownership. Similarly, when I mix my labor with an
unowned resource, the right to self-ownership would likely grant me an exclusive
right to the entire result of my labor, provided that I avoid waste and leave enough
and as good for others (Locke, 1690; Nozick, 1974), because my claim to the result,
even though it would not consist entirely of natural benefits, would be unopposed by
any legitimate claims that others canmake on it. However, when Imixmy labor with
something to which you have an exclusive right, the right to self-ownership is
insufficient to determine how much of the result belongs to me rather than you
because the resulting benefit of the mixture would not be a natural benefit. But this
does not mean that I have lost all rights to the result of my labor, unless I intended to
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do so. The right to self-ownership grants the laborer an exclusive right to the natural
benefits associated with their labor, because granting others a right to the result
would frustrate the laborer’s autonomy or liberty interests in having directed their
talents and energies toward their intended purposes. This is why some Marxist
arguments rely on the right to self-ownership to argue that capitalists exploit laborers
when they appropriate the value of the labor for themselves (Cohen, 1995). Simi-
larly, you would frustrate my autonomy or liberty interests if you were to attempt to
claim the entire result of the mixture of my labor with your property for yourself.
Although my rightful claim to the result of my labor might be indeterminate when I
mix it with your property, it does not simply disappear. Of course, my right to self-
ownership does not frustrate our ability to determine our individual rights to the
mixture of my labor with your property by agreeing to a particular distribution. For
instance, it is entirely consistent with the robust right to self-ownership forme to give
up any future claims to the product of my labor—including the value that would be
theoretically equivalent to the natural benefits ofmy labor—as a part of an agreement to
work in your factory in exchange for a specified salary. But what happenswithout such
an agreement? Suppose, for instance, that you grant me the right to mix my labor with
your property in exchange for an ownership right to be specified in the future. What
should be my ownership right to the result of my labor until such a right is specified?
In the absence of a distributive agreement between exclusive owners of various
resource inputs for mixture, ownership rights to the final product of the mixture
should be assigned provisionally to the owners as a collective until they reach a
distributive agreement. Any other way of assigning an ownership right to the
mixture of your property and my labor would violate at least one of our ownership
rights. Without any distributive agreement, neither you nor I can make a rightful
claim to the entirety of the result of the mixture because my self-ownership right and
your property right give each of us at least some claim to a portion of the result. More
importantly, assuming that you had an exclusive right to your property, neither could
anyone else make any claim to the result. Although each of our individual rights to
the result will be indeterminate, what is certain is that there is no part of the entire
result that does not belong to at least one of us. Others do not have any claim to the
result of the mixture of your property and my labor. A third party would wrong us
both if she were to appropriate the result of the mixture of my labor with your
property without our consent in the same way that I would wrong you if I were to
appropriate the entire result for myself. In a way, the benefits associated with mixing
my labor with your property can be considered provisionally as natural benefits of
our collective activity. Although my self-ownership right only secures an exclusive
right to the natural benefits of my labor, your exclusive right to your property acts as
a similar boundary to the benefits associated with your property. Because there is no
other input to the mixture to which others can make a legitimate claim, the entire
result should belong to us as a collective in the same way that the natural benefits of
my labor should belong to me. Since the only indeterminacy in the rightful owner-
ship of the result of the mixture of my labor and your property is in how it is
distributed between us, the entire result should be provisionally set aside for us as
a collective until we can reach a distributive agreement.
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Entrepreneurial rent is the result of a mixture of the labor exerted by all partic-
ipants within the market process, and it thus should be set aside for the collective
benefit for all market participants until they can reach a distributive agreement.
Entrepreneurial rent is sometimes described as something that is created from
nothing (Kirzner, 1995). Of course, the creation of entrepreneurial rent can be traced
back to prior events involving economic actors and their property. Nevertheless, it is
created from nothing in the sense that it cannot be attributed to any individual
economic input. Entrepreneurial rent is the result of the market process within which
market participants respond to intertemporal changes in the underlying material
conditions and their preferences. An entrepreneur offering a product and a buyer
willing to pay for the product are obviously necessary to create entrepreneurial rent.
However, actions taken by other market participants as they compete for economic
resources are also necessary inputs to the creation of entrepreneurial rent. Without
other sellers competing with the entrepreneur to sell their products and other buyers
competing to buy the entrepreneur’s products, the entrepreneur would not be able to
command a price that leads to entrepreneurial rent. The very possibility of entre-
preneurial rent thus arises out of a complex interaction of buyers, would-be buyers,
sellers, and would-be sellers in the market that cannot be attributed to any single
individual. In other words, the market process itself, which is constituted by the
collective labor of market participants, creates entrepreneurial rent rather than any
one individual. And given the mixture of various labor and property inputs associ-
ated with the market process, it is impossible to attribute any portion of entrepre-
neurial rent back to any individual participant within the market process, including
the entrepreneur. As a result, just as it would be the case when I mix my labor with
your property, entrepreneurial rent should be held for the benefit of all market
participants until they can agree on a distributive agreement for assigning rights to it.
It might seem odd to think that market participants labor in order to create
entrepreneurial rent. After all, the entrepreneur labors to create their products or
services whereasmarket participants do not offer similar contributions. Given such a
discrepancy, the entrepreneur’s labor to create a product or service for sale in the
market should give them a unique claim to the result of their labor—the product or
the service—that other market participants should not have. However, the same
discrepancy does not extend to entrepreneurial rent. A self-ownership claim to
entrepreneurial rent must be grounded in the labor associated with the creation of
entrepreneurial rent, which is distinct from the creation of the product or service that
is being sold. And it is the market participants, taken as a whole, who labor to create
entrepreneurial rent through the various exchanges that take place to make entre-
preneurial rent possible, not merely the entrepreneur. As noted above, labor is the
application of one’s talents and energies to bring about an intended purpose. And
although market participants do not intend to create the final product of the entre-
preneurial venture in the way that the entrepreneur intends, all market participants
share the same intent to capture as much economic surplus as possible. Sellers who
participate within the market process intend to create and capture producer surplus
by taking advantage of the competition among multiple buyers, even if they are not
successful in doing so. Furthermore, buyers who participate within the market
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process intend to create and capture consumer surplus by taking advantage of the
competition amongmultiple sellers. When entrepreneurs successfully capture entre-
preneurial rent, it is not for the lack of the buyers trying to capture it for themselves in
the form of a consumer surplus. Buyers only fail to do so due to the competition they
face with other buyers. Active market participation is thus an application of one’s
talents and energies to create and capture the economic surplus that results from the
market process, including entrepreneurial rent. And once the entrepreneur’s labor to
create their products or services, which should be fully captured as part of the ex ante
cost of the venture, is excluded from their labor to create entrepreneurial rent, there is
no categorical difference between the labor input of the entrepreneur from other market
participants, all of whom labor to capture as much economic surplus as possible.
More importantly, regardless of whether or not there are any differences between
the labor of the entrepreneur and of other market participants to create entrepreneur-
ial rent, entrepreneurial rent should be stewarded for the benefit of all market
participants because there is no distributive agreement between the entrepreneur
and other market participants. Any possible difference in the labor contributions of
various market participants are certainly relevant to their agreement on the terms of
distribution. But, as argued above, until such an agreement is in place, entrepre-
neurial rent should be held provisionally for the benefit of all market participants.
Furthermore, since one’s right to self-ownership cannot be overridden by the inter-
ests of others, what is required to rebut the provisional assignment of entrepreneurial
rent to all market participants is a unanimous agreement among all market partic-
ipants. And given a wide array of views about the good and the right in the modern
world, there can realistically be no actual distributive agreement at all. Of course,
market participation occurs within a broader context of political and legal arrange-
ments that grant the entrepreneur legal rights to the entire proceeds of an entrepre-
neurial venture after accounting for taxes and other legal liabilities. But given that it
is impossible to survive in most parts of the world without participating in markets,
merely participating within the market process does not imply a tacit agreement to
the institutional status quo. In fact, there is considerable controversy and disagree-
ment about the appropriate level of taxes and price controls in all jurisdictions in the
world. There are certainly some market participants who object to the distributive
status quo but are coerced to participate within themarket process because they have
no other choice.More importantly, one’s acceptance—coerced or otherwise—of the
entrepreneur’s legal right to entrepreneurial rent does imply one’s assent to give up
one’s ownmoral right to it. Given the difficulty of translating themoral obligation of
entrepreneurial stewardship into concrete policy proposals about delineating prop-
erty rights, it is perfectly reasonable to accept the entrepreneur’s legal right to
entrepreneurial rent while nevertheless demanding that he ought to steward it
because he has no moral right to it. And widespread support and arguments for
various forms of corporate social responsibility and the existence of initiatives like
Warren Buffett’s Giving Pledge provide evidence that there is a not-insignificant
number ofmarket participants who think that the entrepreneur has amoral obligation
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Of course, given the impossibility of reaching anything close to unanimity among
all market participants, it might be more reasonable to think that moral rights to
entrepreneurial rent ought to be specified by a hypothetical agreement between
reasonablemarket participants instead. However, although some hypothetical agree-
ments will require more from entrepreneurs, no reasonable hypothetical agreement
would require anything less than entrepreneurial stewardship. Take, for instance, a
maximin principle that would require any existing economic inequalities in society
to offer the greatest benefit to its least advantagedmembers (Rawls, 1971). Given the
fact that entrepreneurs can already lay claim to the expected value of an entrepre-
neurial venture as compensation for their own labor, it is highly implausible that
granting them amoral right to the additional gains realized frommarket participation
would offer the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society. The
same goes for alternatives such as expected-utility maximization (Harsanyi, 1975),
which would only support the entrepreneur’s moral right to the expected value of an
entrepreneurial venture rather than entrepreneurial rent, or minimax relative con-
cession (Gauthier 1986), which would actually support the confiscation of all
economic rent, not merely entrepreneurial rent. Instead, it is far more plausible that
a reasonable recognition of both the artificial nature of economic activity and the
bounded morality of economic actors would result in an agreement to allow each
economic community to impose its own rules for governing entrepreneurial rent
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). In other words, the most reasonable hypothetical
agreement among market participants about the distribution of entrepreneurial rent
would be to agree to not have a distributive agreement at all and instead, to rely on
economic communities to come to actual agreements. And given that the absence of
a distributive agreement is sufficient to justify a provisional collective right to the
result of collective labor, everyone who participates in the market process should
have a provisional collective property right to entrepreneurial rent, not the entrepre-
neur alone.When the entrepreneur captures entrepreneurial rent, they should thus act
as a steward and allocate it for the benefit of other market participants.
ENTREPRENEURIAL STEWARDSHIP AND RIGHTS
This section will argue that the entrepreneur has no special moral right to consume
entrepreneurial rent for themselves. Asmentioned above, the right to self-ownership
is not without its detractors. And once the right to self-ownership is set aside, it might
seem as if entrepreneurial stewardship violates the entrepreneur’s ownership right to
property that a buyer has freely and willingly transferred to them. However, such an
objection begs the question. Entrepreneurial stewardship does not refer to the
entrepreneur’s moral obligation to steward his rightful property. Instead, it refers
to the entrepreneur’s moral obligation to steward entrepreneurial rent in their pos-
session because it is not their rightful property, morally speaking. Such a moral
obligation would only interfere with the entrepreneur’s ownership right to entrepre-
neurial rent if they had the moral right to own it in the first place. And the mere fact
that the buyer transfers property to the entrepreneur does not necessarily make
the entrepreneur the rightful owner to the entirety of what has been transferred as
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a moral matter. As an analogy, take the seller’s role in collecting sales tax from the
buyer in most modern economies. The mere fact that the buyer transfers enough
money to the seller to cover both the price of the purchased item and the sales tax
does not grant the seller a legal right to the sales tax. Instead, the seller has only a
custodial right to the collected sales tax and a legal obligation to transfer the tax to the
government because the money that was transferred to themwas never legally theirs
at all. Similarly, it might be that the entrepreneur has a moral obligation to steward
entrepreneurial rent because the entrepreneur has no moral right to it. As a result,
what is required is an analysis of whether or not the entrepreneur has a moral right to
the entirety ofwhat buyerswillingly transfer to them as their own. The results of such
an analysis, this section will argue, show that the entrepreneur does not have a better
claim to entrepreneurial rent than any other participant in the market process.
Entrepreneurial stewardship interferes with neither the entrepreneur nor the
buyer’s autonomy or liberty interests. As mentioned above, although one’s auton-
omy or liberty interests can secure a right to control one’s labor and certain resources
with which one has a special relationship, it does not secure a right to any proceeds
resulting from exchanging resources under one’s control (Christman, 1994). Nev-
ertheless, if one ought to be able to control something, it might seem that one should
be able to freely transferwhatever it is that one controls (Narveson, 1996). As a result,
one might think that entrepreneurs should have a right to do whatever they would
like with the entirety of their profits because it would otherwise interfere with the
buyer’s freedom to transfer property directly to the entrepreneur in exchange for
something that the buyer values (Narveson, 1995). Since entrepreneurial stewardship
imposes a limit on how much the entrepreneur can benefit from an entrepreneurial
venture, it seems to restrict buyers’ freedom to transfer their property to the
entrepreneur. However, entrepreneurial stewardship does not necessarily restrict
buyers’ freedom to transfer as much property to the entrepreneur as they would like.
If the buyer wishes to transfer a set amount to the entrepreneur, entrepreneurial
stewardship does not prevent them from doing so because the buyer would no longer
be participating within the market process. As noted above, entrepreneurs capture
entrepreneurial rent by engaging in themarket process, which involves a competition
to buy and sell resources among economic actors. Essential to this process is the
assumption that buyers will not pay more than the market-clearing price. These
buyers do not intend for the entrepreneur to consume what they transfer to the
entrepreneur. Instead, they intend only to pay a price for the entrepreneur’s goods
or services by transferring their property into the entrepreneur’s possession. Given
the competitive nature of the market process, the amount that buyers are willing to
pay is determined not by their intention that the entrepreneur gain a property right to it
but rather by what others are willing to pay for it. As a result, a process within which
buyers simply pay what they are willing to pay for a resource, even if they could
pay less, is not a market process. When buyers exercise their freedom to confer a
benefit to the seller simply as a function of their willingness and without any regard
to other buyers and sellers in the market, they are choosing to reward, or confer a
gift to, the seller. Entrepreneurial stewardship does not interfere with the freedom
of a gift giver to confer a benefit on another person because a seller’s revenue from
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a reward or a gift is not entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial stewardship applies
only to entrepreneurial rent realized from buyers who are seeking to pay as little as
possible within the market process for what they wish to purchase. The entrepre-
neur is obligated to refrain from consuming the difference between ex ante costs
and the ex post realized gains when such a difference arises due to the competition
among buyers and sellers rather than the buyer’s intention to transfer property to
the entrepreneur.
The importance of the market process to the transaction between the entrepreneur
and the buyer is also the reason that entrepreneurs do not deserve entrepreneurial rent
more than other market participants. It might be tempting to think that the entrepre-
neur’s ability to capture profits reflects their courage, intelligence, or some other
special ability (Buchanan, 1985). Of course, it’s not entirely clear whether one even
deserves one’s innate abilities and virtues to begin with (Rawls, 1971). But even if
entrepreneurs deserve their innate qualities, attempts to link profits with some
underlying notion of desert miss the mark because the price of a good or a service
within the market is a function of relative supply and demand, not the entrepreneur’s
innate qualities. And although entrepreneurs’ innate qualities play a role in their
ability to discover and exploit opportunities to capture entrepreneurial rent, such
qualities can be identified ex ante and thus be incorporated within the compensation
for the entrepreneur’s labor. Other arguments that rely onmore institutional forms of
desert based on the value that the entrepreneur adds (Becker, 1977; Sollars&Tuluca,
2018), the benefit conferred on buyers (Miller, 1990), or the efficiency with which
consumer wants and needs are met (Arnold, 1987) also fail to account for the nature
of the market process. The value of entrepreneurial rent is not determined by any
inherent value added by the entrepreneur’s labor. Even labor theories of value in
classical economics (Marx, 1867; Ricardo, 1817; Smith, 1776) admit that prices at
which goods are traded, i.e., their exchange value, can diverge from whatever might
be the “true” or “natural” value of a good (Foley, 2000). Entrepreneurial rent is
determined by the exchange value of a good, which is a function of relative supply
and demand within the market process. As a result, the market process also discon-
nects the proportionality of the gains and losses realized from entrepreneurial
ventures with the social benefits of such ventures. Just as the entrepreneur who
confers a great benefit to others may not capture entrepreneurial rent if the benefit is
widely available from other sources, the entrepreneur who does not confer much of a
benefit at all might stand to capture a significant amount of entrepreneurial rent if
they confer a small increase in a benefit through an otherwise unavailable product,
particularly if the benefit is aimed at the global elite. And, of course, entrepreneurial
stewardship does not preclude entrepreneurs from rightfully receiving compensation
for the value of their labor. Instead, it only interferes with the right to consume the
income received from participating in the market process that exceeds the appropri-
ate level of compensation for said labor.
Entrepreneurs also have no special claims to entrepreneurial rents on the basis
that they create or discover the opportunity to capture them. Without the entrepre-
neur’s unique labor to create new goods or services, onemight argue, there would be
no possibility of entrepreneurial rent at all. While this is true, a similar claim can be
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made by other market participants as well. Without the competition within the
market process among other potential buyers and sellers that determines the price
at which the entrepreneur can sell their products, there would be no possibility of
entrepreneurial rent either. Asmentioned above, although the entrepreneur’s labor to
create new goods or services can justify a unique right to the goods or services, such a
right does not also extend to entrepreneurial rent because it is created due to the
competitive actions of all the participants within the market process, not just the
entrepreneur. Others have suggested that a “finders-keepers principle”might ground
the entrepreneur’s rights to keep entrepreneurial rent (Kirzner, 2018). Since the
entrepreneur discovers the opportunity to create entrepreneurial rent, the theory
goes, that entrepreneur has a unique claim to it in ways that others do not. It seems
odd to think that being the first to discover something could justify a unique claim to it
for reasons other than more fundamental concepts like autonomy or desert, which are
discussed above. Nevertheless, even if there were a separate normative grounding for
discovering something as a basis for an ownership right to it, it would not justify any
special claim that the entrepreneur could make to entrepreneurial rent because the
entrepreneur does not discover or acquire entrepreneurial rent in isolation. For instance,
even if being the first to discover a new uninhabited island would somehow grant the
discoverer a unique claim to it, the onewho is taskedwith spotting landwith a telescope
does not have any unique claim to the island merely because that individual was the
first to see it. Absent some prior agreement between the crew of the ship, the claim
belongs to the whole crew because the discovery was the result of their collective
labor, including navigation, rowing, etc. In the same way, entrepreneurial rent is
captured only through collective action within the market process. Although the
entrepreneur begins the discovery process by creating new goods or services,
entrepreneurial rent cannot be foreseen ex ante. Instead, it is discovered only in
hindsight as a matter of knowledge that is available to everyone. Once the entrepre-
neur brings a product to the market process, competition among buyers and sellers
will dictate the price at which the product will be sold. And as themarket price for the
product begins to emerge within the market process, so will the existence of
entrepreneurial rent, if there is any, to be recognized by anyone who is aware of
the ex ante costs of the venture.
Lastly, there is no reason to think that it would be unfair to deny the entrepreneur a
special right to entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial stewardship sets an upper limit
on what the entrepreneur may consume—the sum of ex ante costs of the venture—
without setting any reciprocal limits onwhat the entrepreneurmay lose. As a result, it
might seem as if the entrepreneur unfairly bears the downside risk of a venture not
being as successful as expected without the chance to benefit from a venture that is
more successful than expected. Although less-than-successful entrepreneurs would
still benefit from the stewardship of other successful entrepreneurs, market partic-
ipants who do not engage in entrepreneurship at all would enjoy the same benefits
without being exposed to the same risk. Of course, such an objection overlooks the
fact that limited liability for most business entities and bankruptcy laws provide a
limit to how much the entrepreneur stands to lose. From this perspective, entrepre-
neurial stewardship merely provides a corrective by also imposing an appropriate
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limit to howmuch the entrepreneur stands to gain.More importantly, entrepreneurial
stewardship eliminates such fairness concerns by excluding compensation for cap-
ital and labor from the calculation of entrepreneurial rent. Imagine, for instance, a
scenario in which the entrepreneur provides no capital to the venture and merely
provides their own labor. In such a situation, the downside risk of a venture is borne
fully by the providers of capital, who will demand an adequate rate of return to
compensate them for their assumption of risk. The entrepreneur should be fully
compensated for their labor, and the risk of not being adequately compensated due to
the venture failing is a risk that is shared by all labor and capital providers to the
venture, not just the entrepreneur. A different scenario involving an entrepreneur
who provides a capital investment to the venture is no different, except that the
entrepreneur would be compensated for both capital and labor inputs. Just as there is
nothing unfair, in principle, for an employee to give up the right to the ex post result
of their labor in exchange for a salary that is agreed upon ex ante, there is nothing
unfair for an entrepreneur to assume responsibility for any negative ex post results of
an entrepreneurial venture in exchange for adequate compensation for capital and/or
labor.
ENTREPRENEURIAL STEWARDSHIP AND WELFARE
Even if entrepreneurs do not have any special right to entrepreneurial rent, it might
seem as if entrepreneurial stewardship would make everyone worse off than they
would have been otherwise. Profits, one might argue, provide the necessary incen-
tive for economic actors to engage in entrepreneurship and thus lead to a more
efficient allocation of resources (Kirzner, 1995; Van Parijs, 1995). Since entrepre-
neurial stewardship prohibits entrepreneurs from consuming entrepreneurial rent,
one might worry that it would discourage entrepreneurship and thereby harm social
welfare. Of course, such a worry risks evaluating entrepreneurial stewardship as a
public policy recommendation rather than a moral obligation. How economic actors
will behave based on the profit incentive is different from what they should do as a
matter of morality. If morality requires entrepreneurs to refrain from consuming
entrepreneurial rent, they should do so, regardless of what might be their economic
incentive for engaging in entrepreneurial activity. The appropriate question is thus
whether entrepreneurial stewardship is compatible with social welfaremaximization
as a moral principle. The answer to the question is a resounding yes.
Entrepreneurial stewardship does not require any action that would violate the
social welfare maximization principle. Imagine, for instance, that Peter is a com-
mitted utilitarian who seeks to maximize the aggregate welfare of everyone in the
world and that he is able to acquire $1 billion by starting a business. Entrepreneurial
stewardship does not require Peter to keep or consume any of hismoney. He is free to
give away as much as he would like to various effective charities or to find ways to
use the money to benefit others as much as possible. In general, entrepreneurial
stewardship fully allows the entrepreneur tomake allocation decisions about what to
do with entrepreneurial rent based on social welfare maximization considerations. A
utilitarian articulation of entrepreneurial stewardship may require more from the
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entrepreneur, but it will not ask less of them. After all, even in the unlikely scenario
that Peter is so needy that social welfare would be enhanced only by his keeping
some of the profits, entrepreneurial stewardship permits him to keep a portion of his
profits as compensation for labor and capital. As a result, the only potential for
conflict between entrepreneurial stewardship and social welfare maximization
would require Peter to be such a “need-monster” that his implausible existence would
threaten the very plausibility of social welfare maximization as a moral principle.
Neither does entrepreneurial stewardship necessarily interfere with the price
mechanism in allocating resources in society to their highest valued use. Artificially
increasing the price paid for a resource needed for an entrepreneurial venture or
lowering the price at which the combinations of such resources are sold would
interfere with efficient resource allocation by distorting the information communi-
cated to others in society through the price mechanism. However, entrepreneurial
stewardship is a distributive principle that places limits on what the entrepreneur
may do with entrepreneurial rent after engaging in the market process, not an
allocative principle that requires entrepreneurs to interfere with the market process
itself. If the social welfare benefits of the price mechanism require the entrepreneur
to charge the market-clearing price for a good, there is nothing about entrepreneurial
stewardship that would prevent the entrepreneur from doing so. Entrepreneurial
stewardship only requires that the entrepreneur refrains from consuming the entre-
preneurial rent associated with such a sale and that the entrepreneur allocates it for the
benefit of other market participants instead. Charging themarket-clearing price would
only increase the amount of entrepreneurial rent that the entrepreneur ought to steward.
As a result, the only legitimate social welfare concern about entrepreneurial
stewardship is that it would undermine the incentives for efficient allocation and
economic development. For instance, one might worry that entrepreneurial stew-
ardship would actively discourage entrepreneurship by distorting incentives.
Because it sets an upper limit on what the entrepreneur may consume—the sum
of ex ante costs of the venture—without setting any reciprocal limits on what the
entrepreneur may lose, a rational entrepreneur might choose to forgo undertaking a
risk even if it has a positive expected value for the entrepreneur and for society in
general. But, again, it is difficult to see why such concerns are relevant to assess
entrepreneurial stewardship from a moral standpoint. Worries about the incentive
effects of entrepreneurial stewardship as amoral matter ultimately should be focused
on the fact that entrepreneurs do not accept the social welfare maximization norm. If
an entrepreneur were already motivated to increase the level of aggregate social
welfare, there would be no need to incentivize them with anything else. From a
utilitarian perspective, if engaging in entrepreneurship would maximize social
welfare, the entrepreneur who discovers such an opportunity and is in the position
to undertake the entrepreneurial venture should do so because that is what morality
requires. And, as noted above, entrepreneurial stewardship does not interfere with
social welfare maximization. Entrepreneurial stewardship is a part of a total package
of norms that would lead to social welfare maximization rather than one that would
hinder it. In fact, from a utilitarian perspective, what might be needed is not the
elimination of entrepreneurial stewardship but rather the addition of the obligation to
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engage in entrepreneurship and/or profit seeking as much as possible, even if it
might lead to potential losses for the entrepreneur.
Concerns about the elimination of entrepreneurial rent as an incentive for eco-
nomic development thus conflate issues of public policy with entrepreneurial stew-
ardship as a moral obligation. And ultimately, public policy concerns about
incentives and social welfare will turn on empirical considerations. However, even
as an empirical matter, it is not entirely obvious that entrepreneurial stewardship
would undermine incentives that would lead to social welfare maximization. First,
given some evidence that the top 1 percent of earners in the United States could have
their total income taxed at over 90 percent without seeing any reduction in social
productivity (Kindermann & Krueger, 2014), there is reason to think that social
welfare would not be negatively impacted even if entrepreneurs were required to
refrain from consuming entrepreneurial rent, which likely constitutes only a small
portion of the overall income for most entrepreneurs. Second, entrepreneurial rent
that would have otherwise been consumed by entrepreneurs could be employed to
incentivize entrepreneurship in other ways. For instance, insurance programs funded
by the redistribution of entrepreneurial rents could help to eliminate the down-side
risk of entrepreneurship and correct whatever incentive distortions were caused by
entrepreneurial stewardship. Public or market-based subsidies funded by entrepre-
neurial rents could also help allocate resources to the highest socially valued use.
Third, entrepreneurs aremotivated bymore thanmerely financial reasons (Naughton
& Cornwall, 2006; Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003). Even if the prospect of entre-
preneurial rent were to eliminate some of the financial incentives of entrepreneur-
ship, entrepreneurs will continue to be motivated to engage in entrepreneurial
activities by the prospect of greater autonomy, job satisfaction, status, etc. Fourth,
entrepreneurial stewardship eliminates a distortion to social incentives created by the
potential for entrepreneurial rent. Since market participants do not have an equal
amount of wealth, the information carried by the prices of resources amplifies the
preferences of the wealthy rather than the poor. Entrepreneurs who focus on oppor-
tunities to create future goods or services without a myopic focus on the potential for
entrepreneurial rent might be more likely to identify opportunities that can benefit
others in society more holistically. As a result, even if entrepreneurial stewardship
leads to amarginal decrease in entrepreneurial ventures, it may neverthelessmake up
for the difference by increasing entrepreneurs who work on projects that solve
pressing problems in the world rather than those that add a marginal level of
convenience to the lives of the global elite.
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
Entrepreneurial stewardship has important implications for corporations and their
shareholders. As noted above, entrepreneurship is an economic function that involves
the creation of future goods or services by engaging in the market process. Although
individuals certainly engage in such functions, the complexity of modern economic
production often means that a group of individuals will work together to engage in
entrepreneurship through a legal entity known as the corporation. Take, for instance,
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Jeff Bezos, who is one of the wealthiest individuals in the world due to his involvement
in the creation ofAmazon.com. If anyone has ever captured entrepreneurial rent froman
entrepreneurial venture, Bezoswould seem to fit the bill. However, almost the entirety
of Bezos’ net worth is directly attributable to his ownership of stock in Amazon.com,
Inc., which is a corporation created to realize his entrepreneurial vision. Even from its
earliest stages and certainly continuing through the present, the value ofAmazon.com,
Inc. is attributable to the contributions made by its financiers, employees, suppliers,
and other partners to continually discover and refine new opportunities to capture
profit. And, of course, Bezos and Amazon are not unique. Most, if not all, other for-
profit corporations engage in entrepreneurial activities through the aggregation of
contributions made by a wide array of economic actors. As a result, any examination
of entrepreneurial stewardship is incomplete without a discussion of corporations and
their shareholders.
When corporations engage in entrepreneurship, the determination of entrepre-
neurial rent requires accounting for the ex ante costs of labor of capital, both ofwhich
can take the form of equity. It is not difficult to account for a corporation’s ex ante
labor costs when it hires workers in the labor market. Its ex ante labor cost would
simply be what it pays its workers. Neither is it particularly difficult when compen-
sation for labor or capital takes the form of equity. Some equity holders of a
corporation acquire shares of its stock as compensation for labor, known as sweat
equity. In such instances, accounting for the ex ante cost of sweat equity is not
significantly different from accounting for the ex ante cost of the individual entre-
preneur’s labor. It will need to be determined by the market for capital and/or non-
market means. Other equity holders of a corporation acquire shares of its stock as
compensation for capital. Although it has no similar analogue to the case of the
individual entrepreneur, it is not difficult to account for the ex ante costs of equity
capital either because it is determined by an existing market for capital. When a
corporation requires cash to fund its ventures, it will engage in the market process to
buy cash in exchange for equity. The ex ante cost of equity capital is determined by
the difference between the value of the expected future earnings of the corporation at
the time of investment and the amount of cash provided in exchange for equity. As a
result, entrepreneurial stewardship does not raise as significant of a worry about
distorting incentives for venture capital investment as one might expect. A signif-
icant majority of entrepreneurial ventures fail, and venture capitalists require sig-
nificant returns from the few successful entrepreneurial ventures to subsidize others
within their investment portfolio. If entrepreneurial stewardship were to prohibit
venture capitalists from realizing significant returns from their investment in suc-
cessful entrepreneurial ventures, it would likely destroy much of the welfare
benefits of capitalism. However, since the ex ante costs of equity capital incorporate
the demands of venture capitalists to realize a significant return on their investment, a
significant portion of the value of corporate profits must be considered as part of the ex
ante costs of the entrepreneurial venture that do not factor into entrepreneurial rent.
Venture capitalists will only begin to capture entrepreneurial rent when the ex post
value of the agreed-upon percentage of future earnings of the corporation begin to
exceed the expected value of the corporation at the time of investment.
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When shareholders of a corporation begin to capture entrepreneurial rent, they
also acquire an obligation to steward it for the benefit of other market participants.
One cannot transfer something to another if one does not have the right to do
so. Since the corporation is a steward rather than the rightful owner of entrepreneur-
ial rent, it has no ownership right to entrepreneurial rent that it can transfer to
shareholders. Instead, it can merely transfer the right to control entrepreneurial rent
as a steward. Furthermore, since the corporation has an obligation to allocate
entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants, it has no right to
transfer entrepreneurial rent to shareholders if it would violate such an obligation. As
a result, when the corporation transfers entrepreneurial rent to shareholders, it must
also transfer the stewardship obligation along with the entrepreneurial rent. When
shareholders acquire the right to future earnings of a corporation in exchange for
labor or capital, they thus implicitly agree to acquire the stewardship obligation
attached to entrepreneurial rent. Of course, most shareholders will never have to act
as stewards because the corporation is highly unlikely to transfer the control of a
sufficient amount of its assets to its shareholders to exceed its ex ante costs. Instead,
the capital gains of a corporation’s shareholders will almost always be due to a sale of
their stocks to other investors, which should include a transfer of the potential
stewardship obligation to the purchaser of their stock. A discussion of the moral
obligations associated with an investor’s capital gains is thus distinct from a discus-
sion of entrepreneurial stewardship and is beyond the scope of this article.
Under some circumstances, the managers of a corporation might have a fiduciary
obligation to disclose the extent to which corporate assets constitute entrepreneurial
rent. Given the straightforward process through which a corporation’s realized
entrepreneurial rent can be calculated by those who are aware of the costs associated
with its labor and capital inputs,managers of a corporation should not have a difficult
time accounting for entrepreneurial rent, provided that an adequate accounting
method is developed. However, although some shareholders who are involved with
the founding or the management of a corporation may be in a position to know if and
when the corporation captures entrepreneurial rent, other shareholders and potential
shareholders of a corporation will not be in such a position. As a result, most
shareholders and the investing public might be vulnerable in such a way that might
require the imposition of fiduciary obligations on managers (Marcoux, 2003).
Among other things, fiduciary obligations include the duty to inform existing and
potential shareholders of relevant information. Information about the extent towhich
corporate assets constitute entrepreneurial rent would certainly be relevant enough
to require disclosure by managers to existing and potential shareholders. How and
when managers ought to disclose a corporation’s entrepreneurial rents will depend
on specific circumstances and is beyond the scope of this article.
Lastly, entrepreneurial stewardship can be compatible with both the shareholder
primacy and stakeholder models of the corporation. Stakeholder theorists argue that
managers ought to allocate corporate assets to benefit all of the corporation’s
stakeholders rather than only its shareholders (Freeman, 1984, 2010). It may then
be tempting to construe entrepreneurial stewardship as a variant of stakeholder
theory, at least when it comes to its application to the corporate context. However,
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this is not the case. Some critics argue that stakeholder theory would allow for an
impermissible amount of discretion for managers (Boatright, 2006; Sundaram &
Inkpen, 2004). Within this view, shareholder primacy ought to be the proper norm
for corporate governance because managers could otherwise “easily pursue their
own agenda, one that mightmaximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor
national wealth, but only their own” (Roe, 2000: 2065). However, whatever might
be the public policy considerations for corporate governance, both the stakeholder
and shareholder primacy models of the corporation are compatible with entrepre-
neurial stewardship as a moral obligation. Managers who comply with the demands
of entrepreneurial stewardship within a stakeholder model would exercise their
discretion to benefit other stakeholders rather than themselves, thus eliminating
the need to restrict managerial discretion. Managers who comply with the demands
of entrepreneurial stewardship under a shareholder primacy model would merely
transfer entrepreneurial rent, along with the obligation to steward it, solely to
shareholders. Furthermore, the moral arguments for and against stakeholder theory
are either compatible with entrepreneurial stewardship or differ at a more funda-
mental level. For instance, it might be that shareholder primacy ought to be the norm
for corporate governance because any other arrangement would interfere with social
welfare maximization due to managerial inadequacies and/or by increasing agency
and political costs (Friedman, 1970; Hansmann, 1988; Heath & Norman, 2004). In
such a case, managers ought to transfer all entrepreneurial rent to shareholders,
which entrepreneurial stewardship allows. Or it might be that stakeholder theory
ought to be the norm for corporate governance because non-shareholder stake-
holders also have a moral claim to corporate assets (Donaldson & Preston, 1995;
Freeman & Phillips, 2002; Phillips, 1997). In such a case, managers ought to
prioritize the claims of a corporation’s stakeholders over other market participants
as stewards of entrepreneurial rent. The only types of corporate governance argu-
ments that are not compatible with entrepreneurial stewardship are those that depend
on assigning exclusive ownership rights of the corporation and its assets to either its
shareholders (e.g., Velasco, 2010) or its stakeholders (e.g., Mygind, 2009) to the
exclusion of other market participants. But such an incompatibility is the result of a
more fundamental disagreement about the ownership rights that certain individuals
or economic entities ought to have over entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial stew-
ardship rests on the moral claim that the entrepreneur—and thus, by extension, the
shareholders and other stakeholders of a corporation—does not have any special
ownership rights to entrepreneurial rent. Incompatibility with such a claim does not
rest on any morally significant feature that distinguishes the shareholder primacy
model of corporate governance from the stakeholder model.
CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurial rent is created through competition within the market process,
but the spoils do not necessarily belong to the victor. Market participants have a
moral right to entrepreneurial rent because they create it collectively through the
market process. Entrepreneurs cannot raise any good reasons why they ought to be
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entitled to it rather thanmarket participants as a whole. Considerations of autonomy,
liberty, desert, the right of first acquisition, or fairness do not grant the entrepreneur
any special claim to entrepreneurial rent. Neither are there any good moral reasons
on welfare grounds to justify any special right for the entrepreneur to consume
entrepreneurial rent. As a result, individual entrepreneurs, corporations, and anyone
to whom the corporation transfers entrepreneurial rent all have a moral obligation to
allocate entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants rather than
for themselves.
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